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Abstract: This work is a critical response to renewed debate within the field of suicidology with regard to the 
value of qualitative research methods. It begins by rejecting the context of the established debate which 
continues to oppose the qualitative and the quantitative in suicidology. This distinction is considered misleading. 
Qualitative research is not one thing but many. It is therefore problematic to conceive of it in terms of a 
dichotomous relationship with quantitative research methods. Using the conceptual and analytical tools of 
narrative inquiry, this work argues that the debate between quantitative and qualitative methods in suicidology is 
more than a debate about methods; it is also a debate about ethics, representation, and ways of doing suicidology. 
These are critical issues for suicidology in that they extend beyond conventional debates about methods and into 
the ways we conceive of and relate to the subjects of our inquiries. This work makes an argument for suicidology 
to rethink the contributions of qualitative research at two distinct, yet interrelated levels. Firstly, on the basis of 
knowledge, where qualitative methods such as narrative – through their very difference – assist in broadening the 
research endeavour by providing ways of studying phenomena not conducive to quantitative approaches; and 
secondly, on the basis of ethics, where the way we write about suicidal behaviour and persons as researchers is 
considered both a moral and political act.  
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*A recent work entitled, Why we need 
qualitative research in suicidology (Hjelmeland & 
Knizek, 2010) and the responses it has generated 
(Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2011; Lester, 2010a; Rogers 
& Apel, 2010), signal the latest instalment in the 
ongoing debate which has troubled contemporary 
suicidology over recent decades. Hjelmeland & 
Knizek are the latest amongst a small, but growing 
number of researchers to draw critical attention to the 
tension between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in advocating for the greater use of 
qualitative methods in suicidology. Their paper, 
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which takes up a number of issues raised previously, 
most notably those by Leenaars (2002a) on the value 
of the idiographic approach, Boldt (1988), Kral 
(1998) and Colucci (2006) on the cultural meanings of 
suicidal behaviour, and Range and Leach (1998) on 
the theoretical and methodological assumptions 
underpinning contemporary suicidology, contributes 
further to this debate. While Hjelmeland & Knizek’s 
arguments are exceptionally cogent and edifying, they 
nevertheless raise a set of parallel questions which, I 
claim, are yet to be adequately addressed by 
suicidology. These relate to the exercise of certain 
intellectual practices within the field of suicidology. 
 
 At the outset, however, the first question that 
needs to be asked is this: Does suicidology need one 
more paper arguing the merits of qualitative 
approaches? Based on the evidence to date, the 
answer is still not abundantly clear. That qualitative 
research accounts for only three percent of published 
studies in the three leading suicidology journals in the 
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period(s) 2005-2007 (Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2010) 
gives some indication as to why the qualitative flag 
still needs to be flown. However, the fact that this 
issue is still being debated long after significant 
transformations in the human and social sciences 
where qualitative research methods now play a 
leading role, suggests that this debate is about much 
more than the “explanatory” potential of qualitative 
approaches. That is, it extends beyond discussions of 
research methods, raising fundamental questions 
about the scientific status and authority of 
suicidology. Consequently, this work begins by 
rejecting the context in which the traditional debate 
about qualitative and quantitative research has been 
framed.  
 
 The value of qualitative research to the field of 
suicidology has been well and truly established at 
both a theoretical (Benjafield, 2002; Goldney, 2002; 
Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2010, 2011; Leenaars, 2002a, 
2002b; Lester, 2010a) as well as a practical level 
(Brenner et al., 2008; Chandler & Proulx, 2006; 
Crocker, Clare, & Evans, 2006; Dabbagh, 2004; 
Lester, 2006, 2010b, 2004; Orbach et al., 2007; 
Shneidman, 1979, 1982, 2004; Talseth, Gilje, & 
Norberg, 2003). The conventional framing of the 
debate as one of a dichotomous relationship between 
the general (quantitative and nomothetic methods) 
and the particular (qualitative and idiographic 
methods) continues to oppose the two approaches. 
Although in recent times some headway has been 
made in reconciling the two, the debate continues to 
be framed in either/or terms; that is, either qualitative 
or quantitative research (Hjelmeland & Knizek, 
2011). This, however, deflects attention away from 
other equally important issues related to this debate. 
 
 In order to clarify this point from the outset, 
arguments for increased qualitative research are in no 
way predicated on the assumption that quantitative 
research is of no, or limited value. Such a claim is 
patently absurd given the contributions of quantitative 
research to the field of suicidology. Similarly, the 
view that qualitative research is merely a handmaiden 
to quantitative research involves a complete 
repudiation of the insights gleaned from purely 
exploratory qualitative research; examples of which 
abound in the idiographic, anthropological, historical 
and phenomenological traditions. The advantages of 
purely exploratory qualitative research have been 
thoughtfully and comprehensively documented by 
Hjelmeland & Knizek (2010, 2011) and others, and 
there is no need for them to be repeated again here. 
Rather, the aims of this work can be outlined as 
follows. Firstly, to illustrate how the binary split 
between the qualitative and the quantitative works to 
deflect attention away from underlying issues of 
values, language and interpretive frameworks within 
the field of suicidology. Following this, the second 
aim of this work is to broaden the context of the 
debate to include a discussion of narrative, 
representation and ethics.  
 
Why the distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative research is problematic 
 
 The advantages of using mixed methods 
research which employs both qualitative and 
quantitative methods has been promoted as a way of 
moving beyond the dichotomous divide in suicidology 
toward a form of consilience (Goldney, 2002), or 
complementarity (Rogers & Apel, 2010). However, 
Bryman (2007) argues that mixed methods research is 
about more than just testing qualitative hypotheses in 
a quantitative manner, a point also acknowledged by 
Rogers and Apel who note a number of other ways 
that quantitative and qualitative methods can be 
combined. And yet a brief survey of extant qualitative 
studies shows that, in an increasing number of studies, 
the approach most commonly adopted involves the 
quantitative analyses of qualitative data. In these 
studies words, sentences, or themes are typically 
coded before being quantified and sorted into 
classificatory or organising schema.   
 
 The level to which these abstractions are 
considered representative of what Allport (1951, p. 
156) terms “the natural integrations of personal life” 
is a point of some contention, as are the claims of 
objectivity that these studies make. For example, 
Lieblich and others (1998) argue that the quantitative 
treatment of qualitative or narrative data as performed 
in these studies make use of a number of arbitrary 
decisions in tabulating their classificatory systems. 
Although they appear wholly systematic and precise 
in their formulations, they are for the most part 
imposed categories conceived of by the researcher, 
and hence, their claims of objectivity are no greater 
than those which consider the text as a whole without 
using any figures or quantification of themes. 
 
 While I believe there is sufficient place for 
methodological and theoretical pluralism in 
suicidology and that this helps enrich the field, there 
is nevertheless a concern that the quantitative study of 
qualitative data – together with the concepts of 
validity and generalisability which guide them – may 
result in the loss or truncating of important features of 
suicidal behaviour. In committing its researchers to 
the principles and standards which govern quantitative 
methods, suicidology makes implicit claims upon its 
research community to adhere to these values or 
standards in order for genuine knowledge claims to be 
made (Doppelt, 2007). The problem with this, 
according to Doppelt, is that these values affect not 
only the criteria by which research is judged, but also 
the content and interpretive frameworks by which 
knowledge is sought. This means that those research 
questions which help yield quantifiable, testable and 
generalisable findings may be considered more 
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legitimate topics of research than those of an 
exploratory nature. The problem with such a 
commitment, however, is that it marginalises the 
contributions of humanities and social science 
researchers who seek to broaden our understanding of 
social behaviour, personal experience, illness and 
identity. Because these dimensions often demand a 
more critical, inclusive and nuanced approach, the 
reformulation of qualitative methods within a 
quantitative paradigm acts as a form of regulatory 
straitjacket for researchers interested in exploring 
these facets of suicidal behaviour. 
 
Having undergone a similar crisis of faith in 
purely objectivist, abstract ways of knowing, human 
and social science researchers have responded by 
developing and incorporating a range of qualitative 
methodologies into their research program – the study 
of culture and language being two of these. In failing 
to recognise the potential benefits of a purely 
exploratory qualitative research program, there is a 
risk that researchers who seek to incorporate aspects 
of culture and language into their studies will end up 
objectifying it, rather than acknowledging that they 
are dynamic, fluid and context dependent. In other 
words, an approach which seeks to reckon with 
culture and language must start with an entirely 
different set of assumptions than those underlying 
quantitative approaches. It is these concerns which 
form the basis of arguments for developing 
qualitative methodologies in their own right 
(Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2011); concerns which are 
supported by claims that both the quantitative and 
qualitative arms of mixed methods studies should be 
equally informative and insightful (Bryman, 2007). 
 
 For many human and social science 
researchers, science is held to be a practical art 
through which the human quest for knowledge is 
made manifest, rather than denoting a particular 
method by which knowledge is to be established 
(Polkinghorne, 1983). Thus, a more expanded notion 
of evidence, reason, knowledge and method is 
brought to the suicidological endeavour. It is this 
tension, brought about by a concern that suicidology 
is at risk of becoming ‘unscientific’ if it does not 
adhere to the values of a positivist model, which 
permeates suicidology and makes the study of 
cultural aspects of suicidal behaviour problematic. 
However, despite the best intentions of suicidologists, 
the very nature of certain features of suicidal 
behaviour may simply not be amenable to scientific 
study in the way it is currently conceived (Diekstra, 
1998). Consequently, our attention needs to turn to 
the ‘received definition’ of science, and what is meant 
by our use of the term ‘a science of suicidal 
behaviour’. Critical reflection on this issue is 
imperative and may necessitate suicidology adopting 
a less prescriptive view of science. This may lead to a 
broadening of the research program whereby the most 
appropriate research methods are seen as those which 
are best able to solve the research problem at hand 
(Polkinghorne, 1983). Conceiving of scientific 
research as a problem-solving activity presents itself 
as one way for suicidology to address its current 
confusion regarding the role and value of qualitative 
research methods. 
 
 For many in the field, subjective accounts – 
typically in the form of personal narratives – are a 
problematic source of data and clearly do not meet the 
criteria of valid scientific knowledge in that they are 
considered vague and difficult to measure, as well as 
being subject to the interests and points of view of 
those persons providing the accounts. This, I agree, 
makes the qualitative study of these accounts a 
difficult and problematic undertaking. Qualitative 
approaches are not without their own attendant 
problems. However, there is another, less well 
acknowledged point to be made here concerning 
language which further destabilises traditional 
dichotomies. That is to say, as researchers of suicidal 
behaviour we invariably use language as a means of 
interpreting and describing suicidal behaviour. This is 
true of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
And yet for the most part, we, as researchers, remain 
relatively unconcerned and uncritical of the way we 
use language, and of the way we “write” suicidal 
behaviour and suicidal persons.  
 
 In contrast to the criticisms which often greet 
first-person accounts of suicidal persons, language is 
assumed to be a neutral medium in the researchers’ 
own work, a vehicle which is capable of describing 
phenomena “in ‘realistic’, not imaginative terms” 
(Gusfield, 1990, p. 322). However, the searching 
critiques of the representational model of language by 
Nietzsche (1979), Wittgenstein (1968) and Rorty 
(1979), challenge the assumption that language is a 
transparent medium through which we can directly 
access the world of human experience. For 
researchers associated with the so-called “linguistic 
turn” in the human and social sciences, language is 
not seen as presenting an external version of some 
pre-linguistic reality, but rather, it is a way of bringing 
the world into being; of making it manifest 
(Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). Our understanding of 
the world is mediated primarily through language. 
Narrative, considered by a growing number of 
scholars as one of the primary ways that human 
beings come to construct and make sense of their 
experiences and their world(s) (Abbott, 2008; 
Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; Bruner, 1986, 1987, 1991, 
1996; Hardy, 1968; Kearney, 2002; Kraus, 2005; 
Polkinghorne, 1988; Prince, 2000; Sandelowski, 
1991), has therefore come to assume theoretical and 
methodological significance for a number of 
disciplinary fields.  
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Toward a narrative understanding of suicidal 
behaviour 
 
 While it is not possible within the scope of this 
work to explore the many and varied dimensions of 
narrative as taken up by researchers in fields as 
diverse as psychology, medicine, sociology, literary 
theory, anthropology and philosophy, there are 
several features which I feel warrant closer attention 
in light of the present discussion. The first of these 
concerns the issue of representation in suicidology. If 
there is one thing the history of suicide teaches us, it 
is the struggle that individuals and communities 
undergo when it comes to understanding suicidal 
behaviour. One of the primary ways we do this is 
through narrative. For example, family members who 
have lost a relative to suicide invariably try to make 
sense of it through narrative constructions (Owens, 
Lambert, Lloyd, & Donovan, 2008). Similarly, 
clinicians and researchers also utilise narrative 
extensively in their construction of case-histories 
(Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Hunter, 1991). Less 
acknowledged but equally relevant are the narrative 
conventions deployed by scientists in the presentation 
of their data (Gusfield, 1990). Each of these 
examples, whether the intimate portrait of a family 
member, the psychological profile rendered by an 
idiographic study, or the published findings of socio-
demographic, biological or genetic research, is 
illustrative of the manifold ways that suicidal 
behaviour can be represented within contemporary 
culture. These different ways of writing about the 
subject show that representation is not neutral or 
value-free, but that the accounts we produce are 
dependent on the social, historical and moral 
positions we inhabit (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). This 
accounts for both the diversity and conflict in the 
ongoing discourse of suicide – an example of which 
is found in the current discussion surrounding 
qualitative research methods – but also in ongoing 
debates about the merits of cultural, psychological 
and biomedical approaches.  
 
 Narrative, I have argued, is not a wholly 
accurate depiction of human experience, but is a way 
of interpreting, constructing, and constituting it 
through processes of reflection, interpretation and 
imaginative telling. The degree to which narrative 
accounts represent an objective human reality – 
typically seen as a weakness of qualitative research – 
carry little or no significance in studies which 
deliberately focus on the interpretive and discursive 
features of narrative accounts. It is the subjective 
realities that are of interest to the narrative researcher. 
Because the construction of stories is seen as a human 
response to the disorder and fragmentation of human 
lives and events (White, 1981), it provides persons 
with a means for ordering experience, and for 
interpreting, reinterpreting, and imbuing it with 
meaning. This, according to Mink (1974, p. 113), “is 
a necessary condition of understanding.” Narrative, 
then, provides persons with a means for both 
interpreting and comprehending events through 
processes of emplotment, as well as furnishing 
persons with a range of culturally available plots and 
genres with which to transform those events and 
experiences (Prince, 2000). In summary, narrative can 
be thought of as a discursive practice which serves a 
number of important cognitive, evaluative and 
rhetorical functions (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001).  
 
 This suggests that subjective accounts are 
never purely an individual creation. “Stories are told 
from ‘positions’, that is, they ‘happen’ in local moral 
orders… [and] must be heard as articulations of 
particular narratives from particular points of view 
and in particular voices” (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001, 
p. 46). In other words, oral and written accounts are 
linguistic constructions shaped by socio-cultural 
processes of interpretation and meaning-making. A 
major strength of narrative approaches, therefore, is 
their ability to mediate between the ‘individual’ and 
the ‘socio-cultural’ features of suicidal behaviour 
(Andrews, Day Sclater, Rustin, Squire, & Treacher, 
2000); between the ways individuals creatively and 
strategically deploy stories to serve particular 
functions, and the cultural repertoire of stories which 
make explicit particular social values and norms with 
regard to identities, roles and behaviour. Because an 
inherent relationship exists between persons, their 
interpretive stance, and this cultural repertoire of 
stories, narrative methods provide suicidological 
researchers with important analytical tools for 
conducting research at two levels.  
 
 Firstly, it provides the means for investigating 
the cultural resources people draw on to make 
narrative sense of their lives and the discourses 
through which persons interpret and ‘story’ their 
experiences and their lives. In the case of suicidal 
behaviour these may be potentially destabilising. For 
example, it has been argued that for some, suicide 
may be seen as “a conscious act of self-fashioning, a 
last attempt to control one’s life story”, and that the 
symbolic power of suicide offers a suitable means for 
restoring narrative coherence to a life (Sanderson, 
2001, p. 852). The ways persons interpret their lives 
and act in view of these self-concepts and value 
orientations provide researchers and clinicians with 
important insights into the way different life events 
and self-concepts interact with forms of suicidal 
behaviour (Gavin & Rogers, 2006). Yet at the same 
time, suicidal behaviour in the form of completed 
suicide also creates a void or gap in a person’s life 
story that those left behind seek to fill (Higonnet, 
2000). Narrative provides a means for responding to 
this void. A second way that the field of narrative 
inquiry may assist researchers, therefore, is as a 
means of examining the broader cultural-normative 
discourses in which suicidal behaviour is situated. 
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This includes those discourses which carry particular 
significance for suicidology such as religion, 
philosophy, sociology, psychology and medicine, 
each of which utilises narrative to serve a number of 
particular functions. 
 
 Several studies have already argued the value 
of narrative methods in suicidology: in the 
psychological autopsy (Gavin & Rogers, 2006; 
Orbach, et al., 2007), in the clinical encounter 
(Michel et al., 2002), in studies of those bereaved by 
suicide (Owens, et al., 2008), and as a way of 
teaching students about suicide (Swing, 1990). In this 
final section, I would like to consider an additional 
area in which I believe narrative approaches are 
particularly suited. This concerns the role of suffering 
in suicidal behaviour. Like culture, suffering is an 
area that suicidology has had difficulty reconciling up 
until this point. The arguments which follow, 
however, differ considerably from those made 
previously with regard to the value of qualitative 
methods in suicidology in one key respect. Whereas 
previous arguments have focused predominantly on 
the epistemological contributions (or contributions to 
knowledge) of qualitative methods, the arguments 
presented here extend these by making an ethical 
claim for suicidology to respond to the suffering of 
persons within the sphere of its research program. 
 
Suffering, representation, and ethics in suicidology 
 
 Despite the inconsistencies in studies linking 
suicidal behaviour with diagnosable psychiatric 
disorders (Pouliot & De Leo, 2006) there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that suicidal behaviour is, in a 
large number of instances, indelibly linked to states of 
human distress and suffering. While there will always 
be those suicides which appear deliberately calculated 
and without any expression of confused emotional 
state, both academic and lay accounts strongly 
associate suicide with what are generally considered 
adverse events and their attendant emotions – 
sadness, grief, hopelessness and despair. In fact, one 
of the most enduring and widely used metaphors in 
contemporary suicidology is that of psychache. 
Coined by Edwin Shneidman, psychache refers to 
“the hurt, anguish, soreness, aching, psychological 
pain in the psyche, the mind” (1993, p. 51). 
According to Shneidman, this pain may come from a 
variety of sources; for example, the result of 
debilitating loss, overwhelming grief, failure, 
loneliness, illness. Despite its profusion of sources, 
the pain of psychache is intrinsically psychological. It 
is at the point that psychache becomes “unbearable” 
or “intolerable”, according to Shneidman, that 
suicidal behaviour occurs. 
 
 The widespread adoption of this metaphor is 
evidence of its practical utility in denoting some key 
aspect of suicidal behaviour. In fact, as Jobes (2006) 
notes, psychache has become a widely employed 
variable through which the psychological conditions 
for suicidal behaviour are conceptualised and 
measured. However, more broadly speaking, an 
argument can be made for viewing psychache as that 
which has been traditionally and more commonly 
referred to as suffering. For example, Cassell (1991a, 
p. 33), who has written extensively on suffering and 
the practice of medicine, defines suffering as “the 
state of severe distress associated with events that 
threaten the intactness of the person.” Although, 
suffering may include pain at a physiological level, 
this need not be the case (Edwards, 2003). Like 
Shneidman (1993), Cassell acknowledges the 
subjective nature of suffering, and that suffering is 
determined by the threats it poses to individual lives. 
This includes the understanding that persons react 
differently to events. Whereas one may perceive the 
dissolution of their marriage as an event which 
challenges their very existence, this will not always be 
the case. Suffering, therefore, is something that is 
experienced individually. It is something which is 
experienced within the context of a life (Cassell, 
1991b). Consequently, it bears a direct relationship to 
the individual projects, goals and values which give 
direction and meaning to that life (Edwards, 2003). 
 
 If accepted, this view of suffering poses 
significant challenges for a science of suicide which 
holds concepts of objectivity, confirmation, 
generalisability, and the like, as the standards by 
which suicidological research must conform1. It is at 
this point that Shneidman and Cassell differ in their 
approach toward suffering. For Shneidman, a key task 
of contemporary sucidology is to “operationalize (and 
metricize) the key dimension of psychache” (1993, p. 
52). As a result, one of the most common methods by 
which researchers approach the phenomenon is 
through a range of sophisticated psychometric 
evaluation scales. Suicidologists place a considerable 
amount of faith in these instruments, but as Edwards 
(2003) claims, this does not mean that they are able to 
accurately measure the phenomena of suffering, or 
psychological pain. “Rather, they measure what 
people report” (p. 65). This does not diminish their 
value to suicidologists, but it does raise a serious 
dilemma with regard to the position of suffering in 
suicidology. Following Edwards, the dilemma can be 
put as follows: “Retain the alignment with science and 
thus renounce or ignore the reality of suffering. Or 
acknowledge the reality of suffering thereby 
jeopardizing the scientific status of [suicidology] 
(2003, p. 60).” This work argues that suicidology has 
adopted the first position, and that the subjective and 
personal dimensions of intense, personal, and 
intolerable suffering that is at the heart of  suicidal 
behaviour is a necessary casualty of this decision. 
 
                                                          
1Steven Edwards (2003) makes this argument in relation to medical 
science in general. 
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 According to Arthur Frank (1992), one of the 
leading proponents of the illness narrative in the 
sociology of health and illness, the social sciences are 
a moral practice in that they embody and legitimate 
societal responses to the suffering of others. This, I 
claim, is also applicable to the field of suicidology, 
which is both a practical as well as a theoretical 
undertaking, with prevention being its underlying 
aim. Frank’s claim is that the functionality of social 
science language shapes the ways in which 
professionals relate to persons. This leads him to 
question the functionally driven, systematic, abstract 
theoretical approach typical of objectivist 
methodologies which culminate in a “morality of 
distance”, whereby the experiences of the seriously ill 
or vulnerable are effaced by the exceedingly 
impersonal and theoretical language of science. This 
requires that we see suicidology as not merely a 
technical project, but as an aesthetic and ethical one 
as well. 
 
 Narrative style, positioning, and voice are all 
modes of representation (Gusfield, 1990). Like other 
forms of writing, suicidological research relies on a 
number of literary styles – or genres – to present its 
findings. Bracken and Thomas (2005) see literary 
styles as highly structured; as being set down in 
accordance with the conventions of the professional 
community. Consequently, they serve to delimit the 
conditions under which persons can contribute to the 
field, and in what capacity and form this may take. 
Like other forms of literary style, the abstract 
theoretical approach draws attention to what is 
considered important and helps determine the 
contexts by which readers engage with the text 
(Nussbaum, 1990). Thus, narrative conventions and 
style play a significant role in exerting control over 
the professional domain of suicidology with regard to 
the representation of suicidal behaviour and suicidal 
persons. This is a point not lost on Scofield (2000) 
who claims that the ultimate meaning of suicide is 
determined by those left behind. While a full 
examination of professional power in the field of 
suicidology is beyond the scope of this work, it is 
enough to note that like the epistemological 
commitments which ground our research practices, 
the forms of expression we adopt and the stylistic 
choices we make also assist in promoting a particular 
view of persons. Consequently, they involve 
questions of ethics, and what are considered ‘correct’ 
ways of seeing and knowing (Webb, 2009). In the 
context of our discussion on suffering and narrative, 
one of the leading ethical concerns is the way in 
which the persons about whom we are writing are 
often rendered indistinct as a result of the genre of 
scientific writing (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). The 
genre of scientific writing thus becomes a discursive 
practice through which suicidology avoids 
recognising individual human suffering. 
 
 One of the distinguishing features of the 
narrative turn in the humanities and social sciences 
has been with authorial voice, and the critical question 
of “who writes?” (Bracken & Thomas, 2005, p. 209). 
The disparity between authorial voices has also been 
the focus of numerous works in medical ethics 
(Chambers, 1999; Hunter, 1991; Nelson, 2001). For 
example, Hunter’s (1991) work examines the 
differences between the stories of clinicians and those 
of patients. Both rely on a common set of events, yet 
each story is told for a different purpose and therefore 
relies on a different set of narrative conventions. For 
example, differences can be observed in the way that 
particular narrative components such as plot, tone, 
point of view and character are utilised within these 
accounts. And yet in most instances, this 
‘constructedness’ is overlooked or forgotten by 
researchers. Because the decision to include or 
exclude particular events follows from the interpretive 
and theoretical frameworks of the author, these are 
not simply epistemological issues but are ethical ones 
as well in that they raise important questions about the 
nature of truth, as well as the value of particular 
interpretations and representations over others 
(Bracken & Thomas, 2005). This, I argue, exacts from 
the field of suicidology an ethical commitment toward 
promoting forms of analysis and representation that 
are capable of responding to the various demands that 
suicidal phenomena pose to our understanding, and 
not merely those that adhere to conventionally 
conceived normative standards.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In expressing these concerns, my aim has been to 
show that the debate between quantitative and 
qualitative methods in suicidology is more than a 
debate about methods; it is also a debate about ethics, 
representation and ways of doing suicidology2. The 
narrative approach promoted in this work calls for 
suicidology to reflect on its intellectual practices, and 
to acknowledge the role of narrative in the field. But 
more than this, it also asks suicidologists to follow the 
lead of post-psychiatrists such as Bracken and 
Thomas (2005, p. 209) and to occasionally “divest 
ourselves of the protective garb, ritual and mysterious 
vestments of scientific (and philosophical) authority 
and objectivity, and write about our subjects as 
subjects.”  
 
 One of the supporting arguments for increased 
qualitative research in suicidology is that it opens the 
field up to new perspectives and provides it with a 
diversity of ways of representing suicide. However, 
while narrative offers qualitative researchers the 
means for rendering human subjects in all of their 
                                                          
2
 I am indebted to Carol Thomas (2010) for her insights into the 
contested field of narrative methods in sociology, and whose 
arguments I have borrowed from here. 
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richness and complexity, it would be wrong to 
assume that all narrative is liberating in this sense. On 
the contrary, narrative’s capacity to act as a vehicle 
for ideologies (Ryan, 2010), as well as its ability to 
control and constrain, suggest it is just as much a part 
of the problem as it is the solution (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2005). Narrative is always a view from 
somewhere, and is usually constructed to 
communicate something to someone at some time. 
Addressing the complex interrelations between author 
and text, between narrative and discourse, and 
between the individual and the cultural, is one way of 
approaching this task. However, as the example of 
suffering suggests, narrative research is never purely 
an analytic task, but requires that researchers respond 
to the specificity of the encounter through the writing 
process (Frank, 2001). Attending to the narrative 
complexities in our own work, as well as those of our 
research subjects, leads to the realisation that we 
inhabit two distinct roles as researchers – that of 
“story analyst” and also that of “story teller” 
(Bochner, 2010). This realisation may challenge 
many of our assumptions about suicidal behaviour, 
and more importantly, our notions about what 
constitutes worthwhile suicidological research. 
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